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Defendants and Respondents V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. 
Ekins, pursuant to Rule 36, RUCA, hereby petition for rehearing 
of this appeal. The Petition is necessary because the Court has 
overlooked, misapprehended, or failed to give legal effect to the 
following points of law and fact: 
I. The trial court found that Heller breached its 
contract with Rock Wool. As a matter of law this released the 
Ekins. 
II. The trial court found that Heller breached the 
guaranty and the conditions of the deed of trust. As a matter of 
law this released the Ekins. 
III. Contrary to the Opinion, the terms "unconditional" 
and "absolute" do not mean that the guarantor's obligation is 
unconditional or absolute. 
IV. The trial court found that Heller failed to dispose 
of the accounts receivable in a commercially reasonable manner. 
Under California law, this released Rock Wool and automatically 
released the Ekins. 
V. The trial court found that Heller wholly failed to 
prove an indispensable element of its cause of action; the 
amount, if any, due from the Ekins under their alleged guaranty. 
VI. Even if the guaranty could be properly interpreted 
as consenting to a failure to perfect security, it should not be 
construed as consent to Heller's breach of the covenant of good 
faith or the other egregious conduct Heller was found to have 
engaged in. 
VII. The trial court found for the Ekins on their 
counterclaim, but held that its decision releasing the Ekins and 
awarding them costs and attorneys fees fully compensated them for 
the damages sustained. Reversal should reinstate judgment on the 
counterclaim. 
INTRODUCTION 
In defending the trial court's decision, the Ekins set 
out (exclusive of the counterclaim) four separate grounds for 
upholding the lower court's decision. In its decision to reverse 
-1-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and remand, this Court dealt with only one of the separate, 
independent and compelling grounds for affirmance and overlooked 
the other grounds for upholding the decision, each of which is 
fully sufficient by itself to prevent reversal. 
Under Utah law, the appellant has the burden of showing 
that the lower court's decision was incorrect. Furthermore, 
every judgment is presumed valid and correct. R.C. Tolman Const. 
Co., Inc. v. Myton Water Assn., 563 P.2d 780 (Utah 1977). 
Therefore, unless Heller can show there is no valid premise upon 
which the trial court decision can be supported, this Court must 
uphold the decision. Also, where findings are susceptible of two 
interpretations, that interpretation which favors affirmance 
should be adopted. Finally, the reviewing court should affirm if 
it can find a reasonable basis for so doing. Therefore, this 
Court should not reverse and remand until and unless it has 
evaluated and rejected each of the grounds advanced in support of 
the decision. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT HELLER BREACHED ITS CONTRACT 
WITH ROCK WOOL. AS A MATTER OF LAW THIS RELEASED THE 
EKINS. 
In its opinion, this Court stated that Heller's breach 
of its obligations to Rock Wool to act in good faith and to act 
in a commercially reasonable manner were not conditions to the 
Ekins' liability under their unconditional guaranty. This 
conclusion misapprehends the law. 
-2-
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In United States Leasing Corp. v. DuPont, 444 P.2d 65, 
75 (Cal. 1968) the California Supreme Court stated: 
. . . since the liability of a surety is 
commensurate with that of the principal, where 
the principal is not liable on the obligation, 
neither is the guarantor. Consequently, no 
liability can be imposed upon defendants as 
guarantors unless [the debtor] is liable. . . . 
(Emphasis added, citations omitted.) 
In other words, if Rock Wool is not liable, the Ekins are not 
liable. Heller's breach of the Rock Wool's contracts reduces or 
eliminates liability under the Guaranty. Findings of Fact (FOF) 
9 & 10, Appendix (App). 2, find Heller in default. 
Furthermore, in Flickinger v. Swedlow Engineering Co., 
Inc., 289 P.2d 214 (Cal. 1955) the Supreme Court held that if a 
defense is available to the debtor, it is available to the 
guarantor. In that case, the creditor sued the debtor under one 
theory and lost. Thereafter, it sued the guarantor under another 
theory. The Supreme Court held that the guarantor could assert 
the defense of res judicata, even though it was not a party to 
the first action. In so ruling, the Court stated: 
And as such defense to this action is 
available to . . . the principal, it is 
likewise available to . . . the surety on the 
bond. Sureties on a bond have a legal right 
to avail themselves of all defenses that would 
be allowed the principal and are generally in 
no worse position that he would be if sued 
separately. (Emphasis added, citations 
omitted.) 
Supra, at 217-18. This case is applicable to the present case 
because the distinctions between sureties and guarantors has been 
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abolished in California/ and references to one includes 
references to the other. (See California Civil Code § 2787, 
Trial Exhibit D-l, set out verbatim on page 1 of App. 3.) 
Therefore, the Ekins can assert as a defense to their liability 
the defense that Heller breached the covenants of good faith and 
commercial reasonableness in its contracts with Rock Wool. Those 
breaches were sufficient to release Rock Wool from its 
obligations, therefore they were sufficient to release the Ekins. 
Furthermore, the guaranty sets the amount owed by the 
Ekins to be the amount owed by Rock Wool. When Rock Wool does 
not owe anything, the Ekins do not. 
The Court misapprehended the law when it determined that 
Heller's obligations to Rock Wool are not conditions to the 
Ekins1 liability. The Ekins can assert Heller's breach as a 
defense to their liability. Heller's breach excused Rock Wool's 
performance; therefore, it excused the Ekins. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT HELLER BREACHED THE GUARANTY 
AND THE CONDITIONS OF THE DEED OF TRUST. AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THIS RELEASED THE EKINS. 
It is axiomatic that a party in material breach of a 
contract may not require performance by the other party. In the 
case at bar, in addition to the agreements with Rock Wool, Heller 
also had two agreements with the Ekins; the Guaranty and the Deed 
of Trust. 
In reversing the lower court's decision, this Court 
overlooked the FOF that Heller breached the guaranty contract and 
-4-
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the Deed of Trust. In FOF 9 and 10, the Trial Court stated that 
Heller had breached ALL of its contracts, including those with 
Ekins, and concluded: (1) that the Ekins were exonerated from 
liability under the Guaranty; and (2), that the Guaranty had 
been terminated and the Trust Deed should be reconveyed. 
In FOF 9, the trial court held that Heller had breached 
the obligation of good faith "in its enforcement of the contracts 
on which it claims the Ekins are liable." (Emphasis added). 
Since subpart (c) of FOF 9 deals solely with the actions directly 
affecting the Ekins, that finding clearly indicates that the 
terms "the contracts" includes the guaranty and the Trust Deed. 
Since the guaranty and Trust Deed are contracts under which the 
Ekins are liable, subpart (c) must refer to those contracts. FOF 
9(c) and FOF 10 also find that Heller's claims were a breach of 
its covenant in the Subordination Agreement requiring it not to 
take action against the Ekins home. This portion of these FOF 
was either overlooked or misapprehended by the Court. 
POINT III 
CONTRARY TO THE OPINION, THE TERMS "UNCONDITIONAL" AND 
"ABSOLUTE" DO NOT MEAN THAT THE GUARANTOR'S OBLIGATION IS 
UNCONDITIONAL OR ABSOLUTE. 
In holding that Heller's breach of its duties to Rock 
Wool did not affect the Ekins' liability, the Court appears to 
have been persuaded by the fact that the guaranty signed by the 
Ekins1 was an "unconditional" guaranty. Apparently, the Court 
concluded that the term "unconditional" meant that the guarantors 
were liable regardless of the circumstance. This, however, 
•5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
misapprehends the law with regard the the terms "unconditional" 
and "absolute." 
As both Judge Billings and Judge Orme have already made 
clear in recent decisions for the Court, that the terms 
"unconditional" and "absolute" simply mean that the creditor does 
not need to look first to the debtor or the collateral for 
payment before looking to the guarantor. The sole purpose of the 
terms is to indicate that there are no conditions which the 
creditor must fulfill before looking to the guarantor. This 
construction was recognized by this Court in Valley Bank and 
Trust Co. v. Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105, 
107-109 (Utah App. 1987), (Judge Orme on panel) and in Carrier 
Brokers, Inc. v. Spanish Trail, 77 U.A.R. 48, 49 (Utah App. March 
9, 1988) (Judge Billings). 
The law is the same in California. In Coutin v* 
Nessanbaum, 94 Cal.Rptr. 453, 17 Cal.App. 3d 156 (Cal.App. 1971), 
the guarantor signed a guaranty which stated that he 
"unconditionally and absolutely" guaranteed the obligation. 
However, the court held that the guarantor was released when the 
lender entered into an agreement with the debtor which altered 
the terms of the loan. Thus, the terms "unconditional" and 
"absolute" did not mean that the guarantor^ obligation is 
unconditional or absolute. The sole purpose of the terms is to 
indicate that the lender does not need to pursue the debtor or 
the collateral before looking to the guarantor. Bank of America 
-6-
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Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. v. McRae, 183 P.2d 385, 389 (Cal.App. 
1947); Citizens1 Trust & Savings Bank v. Bryant, 200 P. 823, 824 
(Cal.App. 1921). The term "absolute" has the same meaning as the 
term "unconditional." Countin, supra; Valley Bank, supra; 
Carrier, supra. 
This definition of the terms is universal. In United 
States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979) the court stated 
that the term "unconditional guaranty" has meaning only when 
contrasted with a "conditional guaranty," and that the 
distinction between the two is primarily in the difference 
between the creditor's duties under each type of contract. In 
Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. DeLorean, 640 P.2d 343, 350 
(Kan.App. 1982), the Court stated:
 v .... 
The form of the guaranty (conditional or 
unconditional) determines only whether the 
creditor is first required to proceed against 
the principal obligor. Separate and apart 
from that issue is the defense a guarantor may 
raise in an action against him that part or 
all of his obligation has been discharged by 
the creditors impairment of the collateral. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, even though the guaranty is "unconditional and absolute," 
the guarantor can still assert his defenses. Coutin, supra. 
Therefore, the Ekins are not precluded from raising Rock Wool's 
defenses. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT HELLER FAILED TO DISPOSE OF 
THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE IN A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE 
MANNER. UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW, THIS RELEASED ROCK WOOL 
AND AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED THE EKINS. 
The trial court found that Heller violated its duty 
under California law to collect the accounts receivable in a 
-7-
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commercially reasonable manner. The court also found that 
Heller's actions caused a loss of $41,649. (FOF 5, 6, and 8; 
App. 2). 
Under California law, the creditor who fails to dispose 
of collateral for a loan in a commercially reasonable manner is 
barred from obtaining a deficiency judgment. Section 9504(3), 
Cal. Commercial Code; Western Decor & Furnishings v. Bank of 
America, 154 Cal.Rptr. 287, 91 Cal.App.3d 293 (Cal.App. 1979). 
Therefore, Heller is barred from obtaining a deficiency judgment 
from Rock Wool. Under the law set forth in Point I above, the 
Ekins can assert Rock Wool's defense. If Heller cannot obtain a 
deficiency judgment from Rock Wool, it cannot obtain one from the 
Ekins. This point was overlooked by the Court when it reversed 
the lower court's decision. 
It cannot be argued that the Ekins consented to Heller's 
failure to collect the accounts receivable in a commercially 
reasonable manner. The only language in the guaranty which even 
deals with the disposition of accounts receivable is the 
following: 
[Heller] shall not be required . . . to 
enforce or resort to any security, liens, 
collateral or other rights or remedies thereto 
appertaining, before calling on us for 
payment." 
However, this language has no application to this issue 
whatsoever. It simply states that Heller does not have to 
enforce its security interests before looking to the Ekins. It 
says nothing more. It says nothing about consent to impairment. 
-8-
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Heller has argued that this clause provides the 
necessary consent. This same argument was put forward in 
Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 376 A.2d 931 (N.J. 1977). The court 
there stated: 
It is one thing to say that a creditor need 
not pursue the collateral as a condition of 
precedent to pursuing the guarantor of payment 
and quite another to say that because of this 
[lack of a] condition precedent, the creditor 
can by misfeasance or nonfeasance prevent the 
guarantor of payment from ever recovering from 
the collateral. 
The language in the guaranty merely waives the rights 
granted under Section 2845, Cal.Civ.Code, App.3, which permits 
the guarantor to require the creditor to pursue other remedies 
within the creditor's power before pursuing the guarantor. 
Absent a waiver, failure to pursue the collateral first would 
release the guarantor. 
In essence, Heller claims that the waiver of the right 
to require the creditor to pursue other collateral before looking 
to the guarantor permits the creditor to destroy the value of the 
collateral. This is simply beyond natural meaning of the 
language. The only right waived was the right to require Heller 
to look first to the security. However, the Ekins did not 
thereby also consent to a destruction of the accounts receivable. 
Such a waiver would have destroyed, as to the collateral, the 
Ekins1 right of subrogation. "If the destruction or impairment 
of such a right is to be waived by a guarantor, it should only be 
done by the most unequivocal language in the guaranty agreement," 
-9-
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D.W. Jaquays & Co, v. First Security Bank, 419 P.2d 85, 89 (Ariz. 
1966). 
Under California law, the burden is on the party 
claiming a waiver of a right to prove it by "clear and convincing 
evidence." Doubtful cases are to be decided against a waiver. 
City of Ukiah v. Fones, 410 P.2d 369, 371 (Cal. 1966). 
Therefore, a waiver of any right must be clear and unequivocal. 
This clause does not in clear terms waive the Ekins rights under 
Section 2819, App. 3, and therefore it does not operate to 
prevent exoneration. 
In Walter E. Heller & Co., Inc. v. Wilkerson, 627 P.2d 
773, 775 (Colo.App. 1981), the Colorado court interpreted the 
same guaranty involved here. The Court there stated: 
Here, the language of the guarantee provides 
only that the creditor may proceed directly 
against the guarantor in the event of the 
debtor's default without having first to 
proceed against the collateral . . . . Hence, 
under the terms of the agreement, the 
defendants could not compel Heller to go 
against the security, but once Heller elected 
to do so, he [sic] was required to do so in a 
commercially reasonable manner. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Under the terms of the Ekins1 guarantee, they could not require 
Heller to go after the accounts receivable. However, once Heller 
did so, it was required to do so in a commercially reasonable 
manner. 
The Court must recognize this important distinction. 
Had Heller not taken possession of the accounts receivable, the 
-10-
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the Ekins could have pursued the receivables. The collateral 
would still have been intact and available to them by right of 
subrogation. However, when Heller took possession of the 
receivables and destroyed them, its actions deprived the Ekins of 
the protection afforded by subrogation. It destroyed their 
rights in the collateral. That is why they are released. They 
never consented to a destruction of their right of subrogation. 
What Heller did was akin to a creditor having security 
interest in the crops of an apple farmer, who, at the end of the 
season took possession of the apples, but then taking no further 
steps to store or sell the apples, let them rot. 
This Court should remember that it, like California, has 
held that a consent must be explicit and should only be by the 
most unequivocal language in the guaranty. Valley Bank, supra at 
109; Carrier, supra at 49. There is no explicit and unequivocal 
language in the guaranty that consents to the failure to dispose 
of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Under 
California law, Heller's failure to collect accounts receivable 
in a commercially reasonable manner released the Ekins regardless 
of whether Heller could be required to pursue them first. See 
Western Decor, supra. 
Heller's improper actions were not limited to the 
accounts receivable. The trial court also found that Heller's 
reprehensible conduct destroyed Rock Wool as a business and 
damaged the value of the inventory by $25,000 (FOF 5 and 6; App. 
-11-
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2) Again, a gratuitous destruction of values without consent in 
the guaranty. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT HELLER WHOLLY FAILED TO PROVE 
AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF ITS CAUSE OF ACTION? THE 
AMOUNT, IF ANY, DUE FROM THE EKINS UNDER THEIR ALLEGED 
GUARANTY. 
In order to prevail on its claim, Heller must prove the 
amount owing under the contract with Rock Wool. Failing to prove 
that amount completely defeats its claim. 
The trial court found that Heller failed to prove the 
amount owing by the Ekins. FOF 13 states: 
Heller has failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence or in any other 
fashion the correct amount, if any, remaining 
due and unpaid by Rock Wool under its 
contracts with Heller. 
In its decision to remand the case, this Court 
overlooked FOF 13 or failed to give it legal significance. This 
Court instructed the lower court to "enter judgment for Heller in 
the amount of Rock Wool's indebtedness." (Emphasis added.) This 
instruction requires the district court to determine what is owed 
by Rock Wool. However, the trial court has already tried this 
issue and determined that Heller has not shown that anything is 
remaining unpaid. This Court's opinion overturns this Finding 
without even acknowledging its existence. 
Under Utah law, Heller is required to set forth all of 
the evidence which supports of the disputed Finding and then show 
that the Finding is clearly erroneous. Heller has not done so. 
-12-
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Heller did not even object to the Finding in the trial court. 
Therefore, under its own rules this Court cannot review or 
overturn this Finding* It must give it legal significance. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2D 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Ashton v. 
Ashton, 51 U.A.R. 16 (February 4, 1987). 
When Heller failed to show what, if anything, was owed 
by Rock Wool, it also failed to show the amount owing by the 
Ekins. This is because the Ekins guaranteed the amount owing by 
Rock Wool. Thus, Heller failed to prove an essential element of 
its claim. Proper respect for the trial court's FOF 13 requires 
that this Court sustain the lower Court's decision, not send it 
back to give Heller a second chance to try its case. 
In its Reply Brief, Heller argues, for the first time on 
appeal, that what Rock Wool owes has no bearing on what the 
Ekins' owe. This argument is specious and fallacious. It 
overlooks the language in the guaranty which sets forth precisely 
what the Ekins' were guaranteeing: 
. . . we, . . . unconditionally guarantee to 
you . . . the prompt payment . . . of any and 
all indebtedness, obligations and liabilities 
of every kind or nature . . . owing to you by 
the Debtor . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Under the guaranty, the only way to determine what the Ekins owe 
is to determine the amount Rock Wool owes. The amount owing by 
one cannot be divorced from the amount owing by the other. (See 
Section 2809, Cal.Civ.Code; App. 3). The case was tried and 
Heller failed to prove damages. This is fatal. 
-13-
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Heller has judicially admitted that it must establish 
amount of Rock Wool's liability to show the amount of the Ekins' 
liability. Heller's motion to lift the Stay Order in the 
bankruptcy proceedings, (App. 4 hereto) averred that? 
[Heller] . . . moves, that [it] be granted 
relief from the automatic stay . . . to the 
extent necessary to permit [it] to seek an 
adjudication . . . respecting the precise 
extent of [Rock Wool's] liability to Heller . 
• • • Resolution of that issue is required to 
fix the liability of the debtor's 
accommodation parties, V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. 
Ekins, under a certain Guaranty Agreement 
dated December 27, 1979. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, Heller concedes that the amount owed by the Ekin's can only 
be established by proving exactly how much, if anything, was owed 
by Rock Wool. Having failed to prove the balance due, Heller 
has lost its case. 
Nevertheless, Heller now argues that under the guaranty 
the Ekins are directly, unconditionally and primarily liable 
jointly and severally with Rock Wool. It argues that the Ekins 
are independently obligated to Heller regardless of whether Rock 
Wool's liability has been separately established. This same 
argument was raised and refuted in Coutin v. Nessanbaum, 94 
Cal.Rptr. 453 (Cal.App. 1971), where the California court said 
that a party cannot be primarily liable on an obligation and also 
be a guarantor at the same time. The person is either one or the 
other. No one disputes that the Ekins are considered guarantors. 
Heller sued them as "guarantors" (See Amended Complaint.) The 
contract itself is titled: "Guaranty." Furthermore, this 
-14-
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argument raised for the first time on appeal. Finally/ if the 
Ekins were truly primarily liable, relief from the stay would not 
have been necessary. Heller is estopped by its judicial 
admission from taking a different position. 
POINT VI 
EVEN IF THE GUARANTY COULD BE PROPERLY INTERPRETED AS 
CONSENTING TO A FAILURE TO PERFECT SECURITY, IT SHOULD 
NOT BE CONSTRUED AS CONSENT TO HELLER'S BREACH OF THE 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH OR THE OTHER EGREGIOUS CONDUCT 
HELLER WAS FOUND TO HAVE ENGAGED IN. 
This Court reversed the lower court's decision on the 
ground that it read the Guaranty as containing a consent to 
Heller's failure to perfect its security interest in the Rock 
Wool vehicles. The Court implied that consent from its 
conclusion that the Ekins had consented to Heller's releasing 
collateral. However, in order to find that Ekins had consented 
to a release of collateral, the Court had to imply that consent 
from the language of the Guaranty respecting waiver of notice of 
the release of collateral. Thus, the necessary consent could be 
found only after two tiers of implications and a construction 
that fails to give adequate consideration to Ekins rights of 
subrogation and valid protection against bad faith conduct. 
Assuming, without conceding, that this Court was correct 
in implying a consent to release collateral from the waiver of 
notice of the release of collateral, the Court still misapplied 
the law set forth in American Security Bank v. Clarno, 199 
Cal.Rptr. 127 (Cal.App. 1984). Clarno does not prevent the 
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release of the Ekins under circumstances and findings such as are 
present here. Clarno dealt only with a failure to perfect a 
security interest; Heller's adjudicated bad faith misconduct went 
far beyond that. 
The trial court found that Heller took deliberate 
actions which destroyed Rock Wool as an operable going concern. 
(FOF 5.) The question this Court must address is whether the 
Ekins consented to Heller breaking its contracts with Rock Wool 
and Ekins, destroying foreclosed property and putting Rock Wool 
out of business. Neither Clarno nor any other case cited by 
Heller or this Court is on point in answering those questions. 
There is all the difference in the world between failing to 
perfect a security interest because a term of a contract permits 
such conduct and a case such as the one at bar where the acts of 
the secured party constitute a per se breach of the contract. 
Here, Heller's conduct is forbidden by commercial law, includes 
other negligent and deliberate misconduct, and is adjudged to be 
the proximate cause of the destruction of the business of the 
debtor. Will the Court imply consent to break a contract and 
destroy the business from an implied consent to release 
collateral? How far will the Court go in implying consent? 
Under California law, when interpreting a guaranty 
contract, "no implication shall be indulged in to impose a burden 
not clearly inferable from the language of the contract." Sather 
Banking Co. v. Aurther r. Briggs Co., 72 P. 352, 354 (Cal. 1903) 
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(emphasis added). Can this Court say that it is "clearly 
inferable" from the guaranty that the Ekins consented to Heller's 
bad faith, premature suit/ excessive demands, breach of every 
contract it made, destruction of foreclosed collateral and 
ultimate destruction of Rock Wool? In Valley Bank, supra, at 
109, this Court held that a consent must be explicit and should 
only be the most unequivocal language in the guaranty agreement. 
The only way this Court can conclude that the Ekins 
consented to the destruction of Rock Wool is if it implied that 
consent from the consent to impair or fail to perfect collateral, 
which consent it implied from the consent to release collateral, 
which consent it implied from a provision which, in the words of 
Heller, the scrivener, when strictly construed, waived only the 
notice of the release of collateral. It should be obvious that 
deriving consent from three tiers of implications when required 
to construe the document against the scrivener is not something 
which is "clearly inferable from the language of the contract." 
Nothing in the guaranty justifies a conclusion that the Ekins 
consented to Heller's bad faith actions of changing the terms of 
its contract to advance funds, or of its destruction of the 
business — any of which release the Ekins from their guaranty. 
As stated above, under California law, the burden is on 
the party claiming a waiver of a right to prove it by "clear and 
convincing evidence." Doubtful cases are to be decided against a 
waiver. "This is particularly apropos in cases in which the 
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right in question is one that is 'favored1 in the law . . . ." 
Ukiah, supra. Therefore/ a waiver of any right must be clear and 
unequivocal. Any clause which could be pointed to in the 
guaranty falls far short of setting out in clear and explicit 
terms that the Ekins consented to the destruction of Rock Wool. 
Finally, the California law looks with disfavor on 
"attempts to avoid liability or secure exemption from one's 
personal negligence, and construes such provision strictly 
against the person relying on them, expecially when he is the 
author of the document. . . . " Sproul v. Cuddy, 280 P.2d 158, 
164 (Cal. App. 1955). A waiver must be clear, and must be shown 
to have been knowingly made. City of Ukiah, supra at 371. Not 
one clause in the Ekins guaranty meets this standard when the 
question asked is "Did the Ekins really consent to all the 
atrocious and deliberate misconduct of which the trial court 
found Heller guilty?" 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND FOR THE EKINS ON THEIR 
COUNTERCLAIM, BUT HELD THAT ITS DECISION RELEASING THE 
EKINS AND AWARDING THEM COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES FULLY 
COMPENSATED THEM FOR THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED. REVERSAL 
SHOULD REINSTATE THE COUNTERCLAIM. 
When this Court reversed and remanded the decision, it 
overlooked the trial court's decision in favor of Ekins on their 
Counterclaim against Heller. The trial court held that the 
Ekins prevailed on both liability and damages, but that the 
damages sustained as a result of Heller's breach of conduct were 
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satisfied by the judgment releasing them the Guaranty and 
awarding them attorneys fees and costs. (Conclusion 5; App. 2.) 
Heller did not challenge this Conclusion on appeal. If this 
Court holds to its view that the Ekins are not released from 
their guaranty and are not to receive their fees and costs, 
justice and a proper regard for the trial court's advantaged 
position require that this Court award the Ekins the release of 
their guaranty and their attorney's fees and costs under their 
successful and fully proven Counterclaim. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though the Court determined that the Ekins 
consented to Heller's failure to perfect its security interest in 
Rock Wool's equipment/ the Ekins are still free of the obligation 
under their guaranty and entitled to their fees and costs under 
each of five separate theories which are fully sustained by the 
Findings. First/ Heller failed to prove damages. Second/ Heller 
was found to have breached its obligations under every one of its 
contracts with Rock Wool and the Ekins, as well as the 
Subrogation Agreement. Third/ Heller failed to collect Rock 
Wool's accounts receivable in a commercially reasonable manner. 
Fourth/ by this and other misconduct shown in the findings. 
Heller caused loss of values and the destruction of Rock Wool as 
a business. Fifth/ and finally, the trial court found for the 
Ekins on their counterclaim. In each and every instance the 
Ekins, as the prevaililng party, are entitled to their fees and 
costs. 
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For these reasons this Court, recognizing the ruinous 
consequences of the opinion as it stands and conscious, as 
always, of its high and sacred obligations to truth and justice, 
should either grant this petition for rehearing or proceed 
without further ado to rewrite its opinion, sustain the trial 
court and award the Ekins their attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this // """"day of November, 1988. 
TANNER, BOWEN & 
Earl D. 
Brad L 
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CONCLUSION 
In the trial court the Ekins prevailed on four grounds, 
first, that under California law Heller's impairment of the 
security exonerated the Ekins from their Guaranty; second, that 
Heller was in breach of its contracts (the Guaranty and, by 
reference, the Mortgage and Security Agreements) with the Ekins, 
and therefore could not enforce the Guaranty; third, that Heller 
failed to pursue the accounts receivable in a commercially 
reasonable manner, thus releasing Rock Wool from liability for a 
deficiency, which automatically releases the Ekins; and fourth, 
that Heller failed to establish what amount, if any, Rock Wool 
owed Heller. The record below contains some competent 
substantial evidence to support each of the findings of fact and 
Heller has not even challenged Finding 8, that it failed to 
pursue the receivables in a commercially reasonable manner, or 
Finding 13, that it failed to prove the amount that Rock Wool 
owed Heller. Hence, the only theoretical possibility that this 
case could be reversed would be if this Court, against the 
unrefuted testimony of Judge Dee and Mr. Tanner, were to somehow 
conclude that they had lied, had in fact engaged in ex parte 
discussions respecting the merits, and that this conduct caused 
the trial to be unfair. There is nothing whatever in the record 
to sustain either misconduct or effect on the outcome. 
On the first issue, impairment of security, this Court 
could, of course, view the Guaranty and the facts surrounding its 
promulgation and execution differently from the Ekins. However, 
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even if this Court should somehow conclude that the Guaranty 
should be interpreted as consenting to impairment, the judgment 
below would nonetheless have to be affirmed on three grounds, 
Heller's breach of contract, Heller's failure to pursue the 
receivables in a commercially reasonable manner, and Heller's 
failure to prove damages. 
On the second issue, breach of contract, there is no 
question of law involved. Heller has not, either below or on 
this appeal, disputed the principle of law that there is an 
implied or statutory covenant of good faith in every contract 
controlled by California law. The only questions raised on this 
point are factual; i.e., did Heller do the things that the 
findings of fact determined? The Ekins have recited chapter and 
verse of abundant evidence sustaining each finding of Heller's 
breach of the covenant of good faith, and the whole structure is 
cemented into place by the testimony of Heller's vice president, 
Hillman, that he did those things "to pressure [the Ekins] into 
making payment." 
But even if this Court were to decide in favor of 
appellant on the first and second points, it still could not 
reverse. There are the unchallenged findings of fact that Heller 
failed to pursue the receivables in a commercially reasonable 
manner and that Heller failed to prove what amount, if any, was 
due from Rock Wool to Heller, thus failing to prove the amount 
that should be recovered of the Ekins if Heller did prevail. 
Absent proof of the amount due, Heller must fail below and on 
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this appeal. In the absence of a finding that it pursued the 
receivables in a commercially reasonable manner Heller must fail 
below and on this appeal. 
It follows that there is no basis for reversing the 
judgment below and it must, therefore, be affirmed; that this 
case should be remanded to the trial court to determine the 
balance of the post-judgment expenses and attorneys fees incurred 
by the Ekins; and that the trial court should be instructed to 
add to the judgment the sum thus determined. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December, 1986. 
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Dee presiding. Plaintiff was represented by its attorneys, John 
T. Anderson, Esq. and Cary D. Jones, Esq., of Hansen & Anderson? 
and defendants V. Ross Ekins and S. 0. Ekins were represented by 
their attorneys, Earl D. Tanner, Esq. and Brad L Englund, Esq., 
of Tanner, Bowen & Tanner. On December 6, 1983, defendant U.S. 
Rock Wool Company, Inc. (Rock Wool), filed a Petition in 
Bankruptcy which case is still pending in the bankruptcy court. 
Through their attorney of record, Anna S. Drake of Nielsen & 
Senior, Rock Wool and defendant U.S. Rock Wool Defined Benefit 
Trust (the "Trust") advised the Court that they would be bound by 
the determination of such issues as were before this Court, as 
distinguished from the bankruptcy court, without the presence of 
their counsel of record. Defendant American Savings & Loan 
Corporation has been determined to be the first lienholder on the 
premises here involved; First Interstate Bank has been heretofore 
dismissed by stipulation; and defendant Valley Bank & Trust 
Company, a Utah banking corporation (Valley Bank), has stipulated 
with plaintiff that the issues involving Valley Bank remaining 
undetermined after this trial, if any there be, are reserved for 
trial at a later date. The matter was fully presented, argued 
and submitted, and the Court having considered the same and being 
fully advised in the premises and having made and entered its 
Memorandum Decision herein, finds the facts, makes its 
conclusions of law, and directs entry of judgment as follows* 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 6, 1983f Rock Wool filed a petition in 
the Bankruptcy Court at Salt Lake City, Utah for a Chapter 11 
reorganization, which was later converted to a Chapter 7 
proceeding, which is still pending in the Bankruptcy Court and 
which makes Heller's claims for replevin moot so far as this suit 
is concerned. 
2. The agreements involved in this suit specify that 
they shall be governed as to validity, interpretation and effect, 
and in all other respects by the laws and decisions of the state 
of California. 
3. The documents constituting the agreements which are 
the subject of this action consist of Heller's usual printed 
forms which were provided by Heller and had been prepared by 
Heller. They were signed on or about December 27, 1979. One of 
those agreements was a Chattel Mortgage covering, inter alia, 
Rock Wool's motor vehicles. 
4. Heller undertook to perfect its security interest 
in all of the security, but negligently or intentionally failed 
to properly perfect its security interest in the motor vehicles. 
Said failure to perfect impaired that security, was material, and 
was not the result of any act, omission, or statement of either 
of the Ekins'. 
5. Heller impaired its remedies and rights against the 
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accounts receivable and inventory of Rock Woolf both of which 
were part of the security for the debt referred to in the Ekins' 
Guaranty, by cutting off the cash available to Rock Wool and by 
giving notice to the account debtors at a time and in a fashion 
which it knew would cause the account debtors to stop or slow 
down the payment of their accounts and quit doing business with 
Rock Wool, which eventually destroyed Rock Wool as an operable 
going concern. 
6. The only evidence of the values lost by the 
impairment of the said security was furnished by the Ekins1 and 
showed that the security was impaired in the following amounts: 
Motor Vehicles $43,600,00 
Accounts Receivable $41,649.00 
Inventory $25,000.00 
7. The Ekins1 did not consent to Heller impairing its 
rights against Rock Wool or the security for the Rock Wool debt, 
nor did they waive their right to complain of such impairment. 
8. California law provides that when a UCC creditor 
undertakes to collect accounts receivable security, it has the 
burden of proving that it pursued collection in a commercially 
reasonable manner. This Court finds that the only actions taken 
by Heller to effect collection was to send out the February 
notice, which by its own admission it realized would impede 
collection, and to send certain unidentified accounts to an 
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attorney in Tucson, Arizona. There is no evidence as to what, if 
anything, the attorney did to effect collection. This is not 
sufficient to meet Heller's burden and the Court finds that 
Heller did not proceed in a commercially reasonable manner to 
collect the accounts receivable. 
9. The California Civil Code imposes on all parties to 
a contract an obligation of good faith in its performance or 
enforcement. Heller has breached this obligation in its 
eforcement of the contracts on which it claims the Ekins' are 
liable (a) by changing the operating rules on Rock Wool 
unilaterally and creating an insuperable negative balance of 
accounts receivable security; (b) by giving notice to Rock Wool's 
customers which were taken from an obsolete customer list known 
by Heller to contain obsolete balances, and doing so at a time 
when Heller knew it would receive in a day or two the regular 
monthly updated list from Rock Wool containing current 
information; and (c) by attempting to coerce the Ekins' by filing 
suit without notice or demand at a time Heller knew the Ekins' 
were gone from Utah on a multi-year assignment, by claiming an 
unconscionably excessive amount, and by seeking the immediate 
appointment of a receiver to take possession of the Ekins' home 
and having it sold at a sheriff's sale, all at a time when Heller 
was bound by contract not to take action against the Ekins' home. 
10. Heller made a Subordination Agreement with Valley 
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Bank at the time the Ekins' were refinancing a short-term note 
for $67,000.00 which was ahead of Heller's Trust Deed on the 
Ekins1 home. The Subordination Agreement provided that Heller 
could not demand, receive, accept or otherwise realize on the 
Ekins' home, or take any direct or indirect action to foreclose 
the Ekins' home or to realize upon its security interest in that 
home until such time as the Valley Bank trust deed had been paid 
in full. There was no provision in the Subordination Agreement 
entitling Heller to acquire or otherwise satisfy the Valley Bank 
loan ahead of its due date and thus accelerate its right to 
proceed against the Ekins' home. 
11. Heller's tender of a Cashier's Check in the sum of 
$55,000.00 was defective and unauthorized, and Valley Bank's 
refusal to accept the tender was not wrongful. 
12. The contracts involved in this case provide for 
payment of attorney's fees to Heller in the event of default. 
Under California law, if a contract so provides, then the 
prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in 
addition to costs of suit. In the instant cause each of the 
Ekins' is, as to Heller, the prevailing party. 
13. Heller has failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence or in any other fashion the correct amount, if 
any, remaining due and unpaid by Rock Wool under its contracts 
with Heller. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The transactions involved in all of the causes 
between Heller on the one side and the Ekins' or Rock Wool on the 
other, except those relating to the Subordination Agreement/ are 
governed as to their validity, interpretation and effects, and in 
all other respects, by the laws and decisions of the state of 
California* 
2. The Ekins' have been exonerated from liability to 
Heller under the Guaranty, and the Guaranty should be declared to 
have been terminated. 
3. The Ekins' are entitled to a decree that the 
obligation secured by the Heller Trust Deed has been terminated 
and is at an end; that the property subject to the Heller Trust 
Deed should be reconveyed to the Ekins' free and clear of any 
claim or interest of Heller; and the Heller Trust Deed on their 
home be released and terminated. 
4. The Ekins' are entitled to be awarded their 
attorneys' fees, costs and necessary disbursements which have 
been incurred in this action in an amount to be set by this Court 
upon notice and motion and taxed as costs herein. Said award may 
be supplemented upon notice and motion if post-judgment services 
are required of said defendants' attorneys. 
5. The Ekins' have established grounds for liability 
on the part of Heller under their Counterclaim herein, but in 
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light of the determination in that they are exonerated and 
released from liability under the Guaranty, have not sustained 
costs and expenses as a result of Heller's conduct other than 
those attorney's fees, costs, and expenses which are compensated 
elsewhere herein. Accordingly, judgment of no cause of action 
should be entered on the Counterclaim. 
6. Defendant U.S. Rock Wool Defined Benefit Trust is 
entitled to judgment of no cause of action. 
7. As to the defendant U.S. Rock Wool, which had filed 
a Chapter 11 proceedings in bankruptcy on December 6, 1983 and 
was a debtor-in-possession until December 10, 1984, at which time 
the proceedings were converted to a Chapter 7 proceedings and a 
trustee in bankruptcy appointed, said defendant and Heller 
treated the matter of the amount, if any, due from Rock Wool to 
Heller, or from Heller to Rock Wool under its Counterclaim as an 
issue which need not be determined herein except to the extent 
necessary to resolve the issue of whether and to what extent the 
Ekins* have been released from their guaranty, leaving said issue 
to be determined, as between themselves, in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. Accordingly, the issues between Rock Wool and 
Heller insofar as they relate to the amounts, if any, which 
should be awarded to one or the other, and title and right to 
possession of the personal property of Rock Wool, are held to be 
the province of the bankruptcy court, and not precluded by the 
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judgment herein. Subject to the foregoing, each should be 
granted judgment of no cause of action. 
DATED this £^f day of April, 1986. 
BYJCHE COURT: 
Approved as to form 
this day of April, 1986 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
t\. rzST 
HUDiXON HIIMOLEY 
«£•> 
Donntv Clerk 
By 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
_a_ 
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C a l i f o r n i a C i v i l Code 
§ 2787. [Former distinction* abolished: Surety or guarantor defined: 
Guarantiee 0/ collection; Continuing guarantiee] 
The distinction between sureties and guarantors is hereby abolished. 
The terms and their derivatives, wherever used in this code or in any 
other statute or law of this State now in force or hereafter enacted, 
shall have the same meaning, as hereafter in this section denned. A 
surety or guarantor is one who promises to answer for the debt, 
default, or miscarriage of another, or hypothecates property as secu-
rity therefor. Guaranties of collection and continuing guaranties are 
forms of suretyship obligations, and except in so far as necessary in 
order to give effect to provisions specially relating thereto, shall be 
subject to all provisions of law relating to suretyships in general. 
, .JJ9, [Acts operating to exonerate generally] 
• surety » exonerated, except so fur us he may be indemnified by the 
rincipuii if by any act of the creditor, without the consent oC the 
Surety the original obligation of the principal is altered in any respect, 
or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the principal, in 
respect thereto, in any way impaired or suspended. 
12*43. [Surety way require creditor to proceed against principal: Effect of 
•egieet * i"°eeed] 
A surety may require the creditor, subject to Section 996,440 of the Code of 
Gvil Procedure, to proceed against the principal, or to pursue any other
 4 
remedy in the creditor's power which the surety cannot pursue, and which
 4 
would lighten the surety's burden; and if the creditor neglect* to do so, the 
surety is exonerated to the extent to which the surety is thereby prejudiced. 
I fey SUM ktn <* Jtt 11; Sua IM2 cfe Jt? | U 
§ 2 f l 8 , SttbroK*"°«o*ai»»ry to creditor* rights 
«^£ffin?3K r S£A - * 
every remedy which the^edi t^th^ S ? ^ h ? m t , e d to e n f o r o e 
extent of ^ b u r Z ^ ^ Z ^ ^ ^ l ^ ^ ' ^ to ** 
co-sureties to contribute thereto ^ ^ ' " S ^ ° to ^ " ^ *" « * 
in which they became s£fc ' ^ U l ° U t **** t 0 ^ e order of time 
(Enacted 1872.) 
EXHIBIT 
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California Civi l Coda... 
§ 2849, Surtty entitled to benefit of securities held by creditor 
A surety is entitled to the benefit of every security for the perform-
ance of the principal obligation held by the creditor, or by a co-surety 
at the time of entering into the contract of suretyship, or acquired by 
turn afterward*, whether the surety was aware of the security or not. 
Breach of obligation to pay money only 
§ 3302 VuKAgrrpg as nAMA/aiaa. Dir, 4 
Note I 
§ 3302. 
BBJEACH or CONTRACT TO PAY LIQUIDATED sine Tbe detriment 
"fliar* hy the breach of an obligation to pay money only, is deemed 
*o be 
(Enacted 1872.) 
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California Civil Code 
\ ilili iff*** y 1aifctf?fli ***** *f jjtt*ft>tf,a f^os aad^ak^agaraiUiy parti 
(a) In any action on a contract, whan" the coatract specifically provides that attorney's fasa and""! 
nntti which aaa lluilUf J tfi -flfoMi Tli JWTWHm flf ttr* t U l T * •hail ba awarded either to oae of 1 
the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who Ssdetarmioed to be the prevailing party, 
"VktttW 1* M.J&k tf. J*a*rV K»ifW ill Uf contract o/^jtf» *hall be entitled, to roasoashfr 
attorney's feee in addition to costs amTneoesisry disbursements. . . . ./* " 
When; a cwnUrart prvridfli fgr iltprntty't fam, M wt forth abm. auch preyiaiyn abill h renal 
y tpplYiM jff,lhfl tntini OTftyl unlaai tart party WM rremtaual' 
HtTlJ ,.ffiJ"^*' , ,i- , |i" , l l ,f l afinsk 
ReeenoibU attorney's feee shall ba Axed by the court* upon notice aad motion by a party! • •* ' 
be an element of the coats of suit. . * ;•.>••••• °»-v • \* 
Attorney's fees provided for by this section shall not ba subject to. waiver by the parties to 
contract which is entered into after the effective date of this section. Any provision in any 
coatract which providee for a waiver of attorney's fens Is void. 
(b)(1) The court, upon notice and motion by a parly, shall determine who is the pre* 
whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment * Except as provided in paragraph 
prevailing party thall be the party who is entitled to recover costs of so' 
(2) Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed yipiuaat to a 
ease, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section. • 
Where the defendant allegse in his or her answer that be or she tendered to the plaintiff the futt^  
amount to which he or she was entitled, and thereupon deposit* in court! for the plaintiff, the 
so tendered, and the allegation is found to be tnm, then the defendant is deemed to be a prevailing! 
party within the meaning of this section. , v , ^ s _ i y , , , . , ^ , , , , 1 
(Amandaf) by StataJMU, a. ttK, p. ttW, §,lj Stats.Utt> e. 1073, p. —% f L) . . . . . .
 % JJ 
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California Commercial Code 
§ 3 6 0 6 Impairment of Recourse or of CollateraL (1) The 
holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that with* 
out such party's consent the holder 
(a) Without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to 
sue any person against whom the party has to the knowledge of the 
holder a right of recourse or agrees to suspend the right to enforce 
against such person the instrument or collateral or otherwise discharg-
es such person, except that failure or delay in effecting any required 
presentment, protest or notice of dishonor with respect to any such 
person does not discharge any party as to whom presentment, protest 
or notice of dishonor is effective or unnecessary; or 
(b) Unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given 
by or on behalf of the party or any person against whom he has a 
right of recourse. 
(2) By express reservation of rights against a party with a right 
of recourse the holder preserves 
(a) All his rights against such party as of the time when the in-
strument was originally due; and 
(b) The right of the party to pay the instrument as of that time; 
and 
(c) All rights of such party to recourse against others. (Stats. 
* 1963, c. 819, J 3606.) 
§ 1203 Obligation of good faith. Every contract 
or duty within this act imposes an obligation of 
good faith in its performance or enforcement. 
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California Commercial Code 
I 9502. Collection Right* of Secured Party ' :~ * ''.*;*•' ' 
(1) When so agreed and in any event on default the secured party is entitled to notify an acoount 
debtor or the obligor on an instrument to make payment to him whether or not the assignor was 
theretofore making collections oo the collateral, and also to take control of any prooeeds to which he 
is entitled under Section 9806. . !J.J^..' . . . *..'•• 
(2) A secured party who, by agreement is entitled to charge back uncollected collateral or otherwise 
to full o« limited recourse against the debtor and who undertakes to collect from the account debtors 
or obiigon must proceed in a commercially reasonable manner and may deduct his reseonshle 
expenses of realization from the collections. If the security agreement secures an indebtedness, the 
secured'party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is 
liable for any deficiency. But, if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts * ' * or chattel 
paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the security 
agreement so provides.'. .' .;.£?*/ . •••». ^*s.-'. . .•.• ••, *.,••. .•..•» 
(Amended by Stata.1974, e. 997, p. &89,'•«*, off. Jan. 1,1974) * . ""' 
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CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 
Section 2809. Excessive Obligation Reducible. 
The obligation of a surety must be neither 
larger in amount nor in other respects more 
burdensome than that of the principal? and if 
in its terms it exceeds it, it is reducible in 
proportion to the principal obligation. 
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\£%*_ 
RES2IVES 
MAR 2 0 i931 
TANNER & 7AW5R 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK & LETA 
Attorneys for Walter E. Heller 
Western Incorporated 
Suite 600, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7520 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
ooOoo 
IN RE: 
• 
U. S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, : 
INC., : 
Debtor. : 
ooOoo 
STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER RESPECTING 
DISPOSITION OF CASH COLLATERAL 
Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated ("Heller"), a secured creditor of the 
above-named debtor ("Debtor"), through its counsel, John T. Anderson of Hansen 
Jones Mavcock & Leta, and Debtor, through its counsel, Anna W. Drake of Nielsen 
<5c Senior, hereby stipulate and agree to Debtor's turnover and use of certain cash 
collateral on the following terms and conditions: 
1. Heller is a secured creditor of Debtor by virtue of perfected 
security interests arising out of a certain Accounts Financing Security Agreement 
dated December 27, 1979, a certain Inventory Loan Security Agreement dated 
December 27, 1979, and a certain Chattel Mortgage Security Agreement dated 
December 27, 1979. 
Bankruptcy No. 83-A-03213 
Chapter 11 
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£>• 
2. Debtor has collected, and is presently holding, monies in the sum of 
$14496.59 (the "Collected Monies")- The Collected Monies have been derived 
from the collection of accounts and contract rights in which Heller has a 
perfected security interest, and accordingly constitute "cash collateral" within the 
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 363(a). j 
4jW 
3. Debtor shall immediately turnover to Heller the sum of $12496.59 
in partial satisfaction of Debtor's obligations under that certain Accounts 
Receivable Loan Agreement dated December 27, 1979 (the "Loan Agreement"), 
and shall be entitled to retain the sum of $2,000.00 of such cash collateral as a 
fund from which Debtor can claim reimbursement for reasonable and necessary 
costs and expenses of preserving and disposing of the cash collateral for the 
benefit of Heller as contemplated by 11 U.S.C. S 506(c). Nothing contained in this 
stipulation shall preclude Heller from later challenging Debtor's entitlement to, or 
the amount of, any such costs or expenses and the parties expressly agree that 
Heller's right to so challenge is expressly preserved. 
4. Heller agrees that the entire amount of the returned cash collateral 
shall be applied in satisfaction of the latest incurred loan advances or latest 
imposed interest charges under the Loan Agreement. 
5. In the event the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, in proceedings entitled Walter E. Heller Western Incorporated v. U. 
S. Rock Wool Company, Inc., et al., Civil No. C-83-2368, determines that Debtor 
is, under the Loan Agreement, entitled to any portion of the monies represented 
by the returned cash collateral, Heller shall immediately return those monies, 
together with interest thereon at the prevailing legal rate, to Debtor. 
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6. Debtor and its counsel shall be entitled to undertake direct 
collections from Debtor's account debtors on any unpaid accounts and to hold and 
account for such collections for the exclusive use and benefit of Heller, subject 
only to deduction for allowable reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of 
such collections as may be determined by the court. 
7. The parties expressly stipulate and agree that to the extent Heller 
has undertaken direct collections of any such accounts from Debtor's account 
debtors, the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. S 362 shall, with respect to any 
such collection, be deemed terminated nunc pro tunc to the date of filing of 
Debtor's Chapter 11 petition. Nothing contained herein shall limit or in any 
manner affect Heller's right to petition the court to allow it to undertake direct 
collections of any such accounts from Debtor's account debtors based on any 
demonstrated inability by Debtor to successfully effect such collections. 
DATED this / ? * day of J«2 , 1984, 
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK & LETA 
B y _ _ _ 
John T* Anderson 
Attorneys for Walter E. Heller 
Western Incorporated 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
By AJ/KJ^MXJ.AJ^AJ^ 
Anna W. Drake 
Attorneys for Debtor 
3 
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O R D E R 
Upon reading the foregoing stipulation and motion respecting turnover and 
use of cash collateral, and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the parties' stipulation and motion respecting disposition of 
cash collateral dated July 13, 1984, shall be, and the same hereby is, approved and 
adopted as the order of this court; and it is accordingly 
ORDERED that the parties shall forthwith perform in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of the stipulation. 
DATED this day of July, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /j? day of July, 1984, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument was sent, postage prepaid in the United States 
mail, to the following: 
Anna W. Drake, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Debtor 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
n 
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